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Abstract— In the context of wireless sensor networks, the
pairwise key distribution scheme of Chan et al. has several
advantages over other key distribution schemes including
the original scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor. However,
this offline pairwise key distribution mechanism requires
that the network size be set in advance, and involves all
sensor nodes simultaneously. Here, we address this issue
by describing an implementation of the pairwise scheme
that supports the gradual deployment of sensor nodes in
several consecutive phases. We discuss the key ring size
needed to maintain the secure connectivity throughout all
the deployment phases. In particular we show that the
number of keys at each sensor node can be taken to be
O(log n) in order to achieve secure connectivity (with high
probability).
Keywords: Wireless sensor networks, Security, Key predis-
tribution, Random key graphs, Connectivity.
I. I NTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are distributed collections
of sensors with limited capabilities for computations and wire-
less communications. Such networks will likely be deployed
in hostile environments where cryptographic protection will
be needed to enable secure communications, sensor-capture
detection, key revocation and sensor disabling. However, tra-
ditional key exchange and distribution protocols based on
trusting third parties have been found inadequate for large-
scale WSNs, e.g., see [6, 9, 11] for discussions of some of the
challenges.
Randomkey predistribution schemes were recently pro-
posed to address some of these challenges. The idea of
randomly assigning secure keys to sensor nodes prior to
network deployment was first proposed by Eschenauer and
Gligor [6]. The modeling and performance of the EG scheme,
as we refer to it hereafter, has been extensively investigated
[1, 4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 14], with most of the focus being on thefull
visibility case where nodes are all within communication range
of each other. Under full visibility, the EG scheme induces so-
called random key graphs[12] (also known in the literature
as uniform random intersection graphs [1]). Conditions on
the graph parameters to ensure the absence of isolated nodes
have been obtained independently in [1, 12] while the papers
[1, 4, 10, 13, 14] are concerned with zero-one laws for
connectivity. Although the assumption of full visibility does
away with the wireless nature of the communication infras-
tructure supporting WSNs, in return this simplification makes
it possible to focus on how randomizing the key selections
affects the establishment of a secure network; the connectivity
results for the underlying random key graph then provide
helpful (though optimistic) guidelines to dimension the EG
scheme.
The work of Eschenauer and Gligor has spurred the de-
velopment of other key distribution schemes which perform
better than the EG scheme in some aspects, e.g., [3, 5, 9, 11].
Although these schemes somewhat improve resiliency, they
fail to provideperfectresiliency against node capture attacks.
More importantly, they do not provide a node with the ability
to authenticate the identity of the neighbors with which it
communicates. This is a major drawback in terms of network
security sincenode-to-node authenticationmay help detect
node misbehavior, and provides resistance against node repli-
cation attacks [3].
To address this issue Chan et al. [3] have proposed the
following randompairwisekey predistribution scheme: Before
deployment, each of then sensor nodes is paired (offline) with
K distinct nodes which are randomly selected amongst all
other n − 1 nodes. For each such pairing, a unique pairwise
key is generated and stored in the memory modules of each of
the paired sensors along with the id of the other node. A secure
link can then be established between two communicating
nodes if at least one of them has been assigned to the other,
i.e., if they have at least one key in common. See Section II
for implementation details.
This scheme has the following advantages over the EG
scheme (and others): (i) Even if some nodes are captured, the
secrecy of the remaining nodes isperfectlypreserved; and (ii)
Unlike earlier schemes, this scheme enables both node-to-node
authentication and quorum-based revocation without involving
a base station. Given these advantages, we found it of interest
to model the pairwise scheme of Chan et al. and to assess its
performance. In the companion paper [15] we began a formal
investigation along these lines. LetH(n; K) denote the random
graph on the vertex set{1, . . . , n} where distinct nodesi and
j are adjacent if they have a pairwise key in common; as in
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earlier work on the EG scheme this corresponds to modeling
the random pairwise distribution scheme under full visibility.
In [15] we showed that the probability ofH(n; K) being
connected approaches1 (resp.0) asn grows large ifK ≥ 2
(resp. ifK = 1), i.e.,H(n; K) is asymptotically almost surely
(a.a.s.) connected wheneverK ≥ 2.
In the present paper, we continue our study of connectivity
properties but from a different perspective: We note that in
many applications, the sensor nodes are expected to be de-
ployed gradually over time. Yet, the pairwise key distributon
is anofflinepairing mechanism which simultaneously involves
all n nodes. Thus, once the network sizen is set, there is no
way to add more nodes to the network and stillrecursively
expand the pairwise distribution scheme (as is possible for
the EG scheme). However, as explained in Section II-B, the
gradual deployment of a large number of sensor nodes is
nevertheless feasible from a practical viewpoint. In that context
we are interested in understanding how the parameterK needs
to scale withn large in order to ensure that connectivity
is maintaineda.a.s. throughout gradual deployment. We also
discuss the number of keys needed in the memory module of
each sensor to achieve secure connectivity at every step of
the gradual deployment. Since sensor nodes are expected to
have very limited memory, it is crucial for a key distribution
scheme to havelow memory requirements [5].
The key contributions of the paper can be stated as follows:
Let Hγ(n; K) denote the subgraph ofH(n; K) restricted to
the nodes1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋. We first present scaling laws for the
absence of isolated nodes in the form of a full zero-one law,
and use these results to formulate conditions under which
Hγ(n; K) is a.a.s.not connected. Then, with0 < γ1 < γ2 <
. . . < γℓ < 1, we give conditions onn, K and γ1 so that
Hγi(n; K) is a.a.s. connected for eachi = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ. As
with the EG scheme, such conditions can be helpful for di-
mensioning the pairwise key distribution in the case of gradual
deployment. We show that connectivity can be achieved a.a.s.
when the number of keys to be stored in the memory modules
is O(log n); this is a key ring size comparable to that of the EG
scheme (in realistic WSN scenarios [4]). Thus, if have key ring
sizes are somewhat larger than in the full deployment case, it
is feasible to gradually deploy an a.a.s. connected WSN.
These results may help dimension the pairwise scheme
when the network is deployed gradually over time. However,
as with the results in [15], the assumption of full visibility
may yield a dimensioning of the pairwise scheme which is
too optimistic. This is due to the fact that the unreliable nature
of wireless links has not been incorporated in the model. This
issue could be addressed, as was done for the original pairwise
scheme in [16], by considering a simplified communication
model where unreliable wireless links are represented as on/off
channels. The study of the corresponding model for gradual
deployment would provide a better understanding of how the
vagaries of the channel affect the performance of the pairwise
distribution scheme; this will be carried out elsewhere.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II we present the model introduced in [15] for the random
pairwise distribution scheme, and in Section III we summarize
the relevant work from the companion paper [15]. Section
IV presents the main results of the paper; proofs are given
in Section VI and Section VII. Section V contains some
simulation results.
II. T HE MODEL
A. Implementing pairwise key distribution schemes
The random pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan et
al. is parametrized by two positive integersn andK such that
K < n. There aren nodes which are labelledi = 1, . . . , n.
with unique idsId1, . . . , Idn. Write N := {1, . . . n} and set
N−i := N − {i} for each i = 1, . . . , n. With node i we
associate a subsetΓn,i nodes selected atrandom from N−i
– We say that each of the nodes inΓ ,i is paired to nodei.
Thus, for any subsetA ⊆ N−i, we require








if |A| = K
0 otherwise.
The selection ofΓn,i is doneuniformlyamongst all subsets of
N−i which are of size exactlyK. The rvsΓn,1, . . . , Γn,n are
assumed to be mutually independent so that




P [Γn,i = Ai]
for arbitrary A1, . . . , An subsets ofN−1, . . . ,N−n, respec-
tively.
On the basis of thisofflinerandom pairing, we now construct
the key ringsΣn,1, . . . , Σn,n, one for each node, as follows:
Assumed available is a collection ofnK distinct cryptographic
keys {ωi|ℓ, i = 1, . . . , n; ℓ = 1, . . . , K} – These keys are
drawn from a very large pool of keys; in practice the pool
size is assumed to be much larger thannK, and can be safely
taken to be infinite for the purpose of our discussion.
Now, fix i = 1, . . . , n and let ℓn,i : Γn,i → {1, . . . , K}
denote a labeling ofΓn,i. For each nodej in Γn,i paired to
i, the cryptographic keyωi|ℓn,i(j) is associated withj. For
instance, if the random setΓn,i is realized as{j1, . . . , jK}
with 1 ≤ j1 < . . . < jK ≤ n, then an obvious labeling
consists inℓn,i(jk) = k for eachk = 1, . . . , K with key ωi|k
associated with nodejk. Of course other labeling are possible.
e.g., according to decreasing labels or according to a random
permutation. The pairwise key
ω⋆n,ij = [Idi|Idj |ωi|ℓn,i(j)]
is constructed and inserted in the memory modules of both
nodesi andj. Inherent to this construction is the fact that the
key ω⋆n,ij is assignedexclusivelyto the pair of nodesi andj,
hence the terminology pairwise distribution scheme. The key
ring Σn,i of nodei is the set
Σn,i := {ω⋆n,ij, j ∈ Γn,i} ∪ {ω⋆n,ji, i ∈ Γn,j} (1)
as we take into account the possibility that nodei was paired to
some other nodej. As mentioned earlier, under full visibility,
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two node, sayi and j, can establish a secure link if at least
one of the eventsi ∈ Γn,j or j ∈ Γn,j is taking place. Note
that both events can take place, in which case the memory
modules of nodei and j each contain the distinct keysω⋆n,ij
and ω⋆n,ji. It is also plain that by construction this scheme
supports node-to-node authentication.
B. Gradual deployment
Initially n node identities were generated and the key rings
Σn,1, . . . , Σn,n were constructed as indicated above – Heren
stands for the maximum possible network size and should be
selected large enough. This key selection procedure does not
require the physical presence of the sensor entities and can
be implemented completely on the software level. We now
describe how this offline pairwise key distribution scheme can
support gradual network deployment in consecutive stages.In
the initial phase of deployment, with0 < γ1 < 1, let ⌊γ1n⌋
sensors be produced and given the labels1, . . . , ⌊γ1n⌋. The
key ringsΣn,1, . . . , Σn,⌊γ1n⌋ are then inserted into the memory
modules of the sensors1, . . . , ⌊γ1n⌋, respectively. Imagine
now that more sensors are needed, say⌊γ2n⌋−⌊γ1n⌋ sensors
with 0 < γ1 < γ2 ≤ 1. Then, ⌊γ2n⌋ − ⌊γ1n⌋ additional
sensors would be produced, this second batch of sensors
would be assigned labels⌊γ1n⌋ + 1, . . . , ⌊γ2n⌋, and the key
rings Σn,⌊γ1n⌋+1, . . . , Σn,⌊γ2n⌋ would be inserted into their
memory modules. Once this is done, these⌊γ2n⌋−⌊γ1n⌋ new
sensors are added to the network (which now comprises⌊γ2n⌋
deployed sensors). This step may be repeated a number times:
In fact, for some finite integerℓ, consider positive scalars
0 < γ1 < . . . < γℓ ≤ 1 (with γ0 = 0 by convention). We
can then deploy the sensor network inℓ consecutive phases,
with thekth phase adding⌊γkn⌋−⌊γk−1n⌋ new nodes to the
network for eachk = 1, . . . , ℓ.
III. R ELATED WORK
The pairwise distribution scheme naturally gives rise to the
following class of random graphs: Withn = 2, 3, . . . and
positive integerK with K < n, the distinct nodesi and j
are said to beadjacent, written i ∼ j, if and only if they have
at least one key in common in their key rings, namely
i ∼ j iff Σn,i ∩ Σn,j 6= ∅. (2)
Let H(n; K) denote the undirected random graph on the vertex
set {1, . . . , n} induced through the adjacency notion (2), To
keep the notation simple we have omitted the dependence on
K for most of the quantities introduced so far. In what follows
we largely abide by this practice, although we shall make the
dependence onK explicit in a few places when scalingK
with the numbern of users.
Below we summarize results obtained in the companion
paper [15]. We set
P (n; K) := P [H(n; K) is connected] .
In [15] we have shown the following zero-one law.
Theorem 3.1: With K a positive integer, it holds that
lim
n→∞




0 if K = 1
1 if K ≥ 2.
(3)
Moreover, for anyK ≥ 2, we have
P (n; K) ≥ 1 − 27
2n2
(4)
for all n = 2, 3, . . . sufficiently large.
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 3.1, Yağan and
Makowski also obtained the behavior of graph connectivity as
the parameterK is scaled withn [15]. First some terminology:
Any mappingK : N0 → N0 is called ascaling provided the
conditionKn < n holds for alln = 1, 2, . . ..
Corollary 3.2: For any scalingK : N0 → N0 such that
Kn ≥ 2 for all n sufficiently large, we have the one-law
limn→∞ P (n; Kn) = 1.
Theorem 3.1 and its Corollary 3.2 together show that
very small values ofK suffice for a.a.s. connectivity of the
random graphH(n; K). The mere fact thatH(n; K) becomes
connected even with very smallK values does not imply that
thenumberof keys (i.e., the size|Σn,i|) to achieve connectivity
is necessarily small. This is because in contrast with the EG
scheme and its variants, the pairwise scheme produces key
rings of variable size betweenK andK +(n−1). To explore
this issue further we first recall minimal conditions on a scaling
K : N0 → N0 which ensure that the key ring of a node has
size roughly of the order (of its mean)2Kn whenn is large
[15].




as soon aslimn→∞ Kn = ∞.
Thus, whenn is large |Σn,1(Kn)| fluctuates fromKn to
Kn +(n−1) with a propensity to hover about2Kn under the
conditions of Lemma 3.3. This result is sharpened with the
help of a concentration result for the maximal key ring size
under an appropriate class of scalings. We define the maximal







, n = 2, 3, . . .
Theorem 3.4: Consider a scalingK : N0 → N0 of the form
Kn ∼ λ log n (5)
with λ > 0. If λ > λ⋆ := (2 log 2 − 1)−1 ≃ 2.6, then there
existsc(λ) in the interval(0, λ) such that
lim
n→∞
P [|Mn(Kn) − 2Kn| ≥ c log n] = 0 (6)
wheneverc(λ) < c < λ.
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IV. T HE RESULTS
With the network deployed gradually over time as described
in Section II-B, we are interested in understanding how the
parameterK needs to be scaled with largen to ensure that
connectivity ismaintaineda.a.s. throughout gradual deploy-
ment. Consider positive integersn = 2, 3, . . . and K with
K < n. With γ in the interval(0, 1), let Hγ(n; K) denote the
subgraph ofH(n; K) restricted to the nodes{1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋}.
Given scalars0 < γ1 < . . . < γℓ ≤ 1, we seek conditions
on the parametersK and n such thatHγi(n; K) is a.a.s.
connected for eachi = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ.
First we write
Pγ(n; K) := P [Hγ(n; K) is connected] = P [Cn,γ(K)]
whereCn,γ(K) denote the event thatHγ(n; K) is connected.
The fact that H(n; K) is connected doesnot imply that
Hγ(n; K) is necessarily connected. Indeed, with distinct nodes
i, j = 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋, the path that exists inH(n; K) between
these nodes (as a result of the assumed connectivity of
H(n; K)) may comprise edges that are not inHγ(n; K). The
next result provides an analog of Corollary 3.2 in this new
setting.
Theorem 4.1: With γ in the unit interval(0, 1) andc > 0,





Then, we havelimn→∞ Pγ(n; Kn) = 1 wheneverc > 1.
The random graphsH(n; K) andHγ(n; K) have very dif-
ferent neighborhood structures. Indeed, any node inH( ; K)
has degree at leastK, so that no node is isolated inH(n; K).
However, there is a positive probability that isolated nodes
exist in Hγ(n; K). In fact, with
P ⋆γ (n; Kn) := P [Hγ(n; K) contains no isolated nodes] ,
we have the following zero-one law.
Theorem 4.2: With γ in the unit interval(0, 1), consider a








0 if c < r(γ)
1 if c > r(γ)
(8)
where the thresholdr(γ) is given by
r(γ) :=
(




As can be seen from Figure 1,r(γ) is decreasing on the
interval [0, 1] with limγ↓0 r(γ) = 12 and limγ↑1 r(γ) = 0.
Since a connected graph has no isolated nodes, Theorem 4.2
yields limn→∞ P [Hγ(n; Kn) is connected] = 0 if the scaling
K : N0 → N0 satisfies (7) withc < r(γ). The following
corollary is now immediate from Theorem 4.1.















Fig. 1. r(γ) vs γ.
Corollary 4.3: With γ in the unit interval(0, 1), consider a








0 if c < r(γ)
1 if c > 1
(10)
wherer(γ) is given by (9).
Corollary 4.3 does not provide a full zero-one law for the
connectivity of Hγ(n; Kn) as there is a gap between the
thresholdr(γ) of the zero-law and the threshold1 of the one-
law. Yet, as can be seen from Figure 1, the gap between the
thresholds of the zero-law and the one-law is quite small with
1
2 < 1 − r(γ) < 1. More importantly, Corollary 4.3 already
implies (via a monotonicity argument) that it is necessaryand
sufficient to keep the parameterKn on the order oflog n
to ensure that the graphHγ(n; Kn) is a.a.s. connected. It is
worth pointing out that the simulation results in Section V
suggest the existence of a full zero-one law forPγ(n; Kn)
with a threshold resemblingr(γ). This would not be surprising
since in many known classes of random graphs, the absence
of isolated nodes and graph connectivity are asymptotically
equivalent properties, e.g., Erdős-Rényi graphs [2] andr om
key graphs [10, 12], among others.
Finally we turn to gradual network deployment as discussed
in Section II-A.
Theorem 4.4: With 0 < γ1 < γ2 < . . . < γℓ ≤ 1, consider






for somec > 1. Then we have
lim
n→∞
P [Cn,γ1(Kn) ∩ . . . ∩ Cn,γℓ(Kn)] = 1. (12)
The event[Cγ1,n(Kn) ∩ . . . ∩ Cγℓ,n(Kn)] corresponds to
the network ineachof its ℓ phases being connected as more
nodes get added – In other words, on that event the sensors
do form a connected network at each phase of deployment.
As a result, we infer via Theorem 4.4 that the condition (11)
(with c > 1) is enough to ensure that the network remains
a.a.s. connected as more sensors are deployed over time.
The main conclusions of the paper, obtained by combining
Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 4.4, can now be summarized as
follows:
Corollary 4.5: With 0 < γ1 < γ2 < . . . < γℓ ≤ 1,







· log n, n = 2, 3, . . . (13)
Then, the following holds:
1) The maximum number of keys kept in the memory module
of each sensor will be a.a.s. less than3Kn;
2) The network deployed gradually inℓ steps (as in Section
II-B) will be a.a.s. connected in each of theℓ phases of
deployment.
V. SIMULATION STUDY
We now present experimental results in support of Theorem
4.1 and Theorem 4.2. In each set of experiments, we fixn
andγ. Then, we generate random graphsHγ(n; K) for each
K = 1, . . . , Kmax where the maximal valueKmax is selected
large enough to ensure that the range ofc computed through
K = c · log n
γ
(14)
exceeds1. In each case, we check whether the generated
random graph has isolated nodes and is connected. We repeat
the process500 times for each pair of valuesγ and K in
order to estimate the probabilities of the events of interest.
Due to the integer constraint onK, the values ofc cannot be
varied arbitrarily and the number of data points that can be
obtained in the range(0, 1) is thereforelimited. Thus, to better
assess the dependence ofP ⋆γ (n; Kn) and Pγ(n; Kn) on c in
the figures, we make use of the curve-fitting tool of MATLAB.
For various values ofγ, Figure 2 and Figure 3 display
the estimated probabilityP ⋆γ (n; Kn) that Hγ(n; K) has no
isolated nodes as a function ofc. Here,n is taken to be1, 000
andc is computed through (14) for various values ofK. The
plots in Figure 2 clearly confirm the claims of Theorem 4.2:
In each caseP ⋆γ (n; Kn) exhibits a threshold behavior and
the transitions fromP ⋆γ (n; Kn) = 0 to P
⋆
γ (n; Kn) = 1 take
place aroundc = r(γ). Also, it is evident from Figure 3 that
the value ofc at which the transition occurs decreases asγ
increases, while the rate of decrease is much faster for larger
values ofγ. This is compatible with the behavior ofr(γ) given
in Figure 1.
















































Fig. 2. Probability thatHγ(n; K) contains no isolated nodes estimated via
500 experiments withn = 1, 000 andK = c · log n
γ
.
Similarly, Figure 4 shows the estimated probability
Pγ(n; Kn) for various values ofγ with n = 500 as c ranges
over the interval(0, 1). For each specifiedγ, we can conclude
by monotonicity thatPγ(n; Kn) = 1 wheneverc > 1, in
agreement with Theorem 4.1. As pointed out earlier, Figure 4
suggests thatPγ(n; Kn) exhibits a full zero-one law similar
to that of Theorem 4.2 with a threshold behaving liker(γ).
More work is in progress on this issue.
VI. A PROOF OFTHEOREM 4.1
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . andγ in the interval(0, 1), and consider
a positive integerK ≥ 2. Throughout the discussion, is
sufficiently large so that the conditions
2(K + 1) < n, K + 1 ≤ n − ⌊γn⌋ and 2 < γn (15)
are all enforced; these conditions are made in order to avoid
degenerate situations which have no bearing on the final result.
There is no loss of generality in doing so as we eventually let
n go to infinity.
For any non-empty subsetR contained in{1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋},
we define the graphHγ(n; K)(R) (with vertex setR) as the
subgraph ofHγ(n; K) restricted to the nodes inR. We say that
R is isolatedin Hγ(n; K) if there are no edges (inHγ(n; K))
between the nodes inR and the nodes in its complement
Rc|γ := {1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋}−R. This is characterized by the event
Bn,γ(K; R) given by
Bn,γ(K; R) :=
[
i 6∈ Γn,j, j /∈ Γn,i, i ∈ R, j ∈ Rc|γ
]
.
Also, let Cn,γ(K; R) denote the event that the induced sub-
graphHγ(n; K)(R) is itself connected. Finally, we set
An,γ(K; R) := Cn,γ(K; R) ∩ Bn,γ(K; R).
6
















































Fig. 3. Probability thatHγ(n;K) contains no isolated nodes estimated via
500 experiments withn = 1, 000 andK = c · log n
γ
.
The discussion starts with the following basic observation:
If Hγ(n; K) is not connected, then there must exist a non-
empty subsetR of nodes contained in{1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋}, such
that Hγ(n; K)(R) is itself connected whileR is isolated in
Hγ(n; K). This is captured by the inclusion
Cn,γ(K)
c ⊆ ∪R∈Nn,γ An,γ(K; R) (16)
with Nn,γ denoting the collection of all non-empty subsets of
{1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋}. This union need only be taken over all non-
empty subsetsR of {1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋} with 1 ≤ |R| ≤ ⌊ ⌊γn⌋2 ⌋,
and it is useful to note that⌊ ⌊γn⌋2 ⌋ = ⌊
γn
2 ⌋. Then, a standard






















where Nn,γ,r denotes the collection of all subsets of
{1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋} with exactlyr elements.
For eachr = 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋, when R = {1, . . . , r}, we
simplify the notation by writingAn,γ,r(K) := An,γ(K; R),
Bn,γ,r(K) := Bn,γ(K; R) and Cn,γ,r(K) := Cn,γ(K; R).
For r = ⌊γn⌋, the notationCn,γ,⌊γn⌋(K) coincides with
Cn,γ(K) as defined earlier. Under the enforced assumptions,
it is a simple matter to check by exchangeability that
P [An,γ(K; R)] = P [An,γ,r(K)] , R ∈ Nn.γ,r










































Fig. 4. Probability thatHγ(n;K) is connected estimated via500 experi-





























as we make use of the obvious inclusionAn,γ,r(K) ⊆

























To see why this last relation holds, recall that for the set
{1, . . . , r} to be isolatedin Hγ(n; K) we need that (i) each of
the nodesr + 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋ are adjacent only to nodesoutside
the set of nodes{1, . . . , r}; and (ii) none of the nodes1, . . . , r
are adjacent with any of the nodesr +1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋ – This last
requirement does not preclude adjacency with any of the nodes

































with conditions (15) ensuring that the binomial coefficients are
well defined.
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The remainder of the proof consists in bounding each of
the terms in (20). To do so we make use of several standard








, r = 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋.






















y−ℓ decreases asℓ increases fromℓ = 0 to ℓ = K − 1.





























































≤ (γne)r · e−(
⌊γn⌋−r
n )rK · e−( rn )(⌊γn⌋−r)K .






























as we note that
⌊γn⌋ − r
n




, r = 1, . . . , ⌊γn
2
⌋.
Next, consider a scalingK : N0 → N0 such that (7) holds
for somec > 1, and replaceK by Kn in (21) according to
this scaling. Using the form (7) of the scaling we get,


















for eachn = 1, 2, . . ., with limn→∞ cn = c. It is a simple









so that by virtue of the fact thatc > 1, we have
lim
n→∞
an = 0. (22)


















where for n sufficiently large the summability of the
geometric series is guaranteed by (22). The conclusion
limn→∞ P [Cn,γ(K)
c] = 0 is now a straightforward conse-
quence of the last bound, again by virtue of (22).
VII. A PROOF OFTHEOREM 4.2
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and considerγ in (0, 1) and positive integer
K such thatK < n. We write
χn,γ,i(K) := 1 [Node i is isolated in Hγ(n; K)]
for eachi = 1, . . . , ⌊γn⌋. The number of isolated nodes in






whence the random graphHγ(n; K) has no isolated nodes if
In,γ(K) = 0. The method of first moment [8, Eqn (3.10), p.
55] and second moment [8, Remark 3.1, p. 55] yield the useful
bounds





The rvsχn,γ,1(K), . . . , χn,γ,⌊γn⌋(K) being exchangeable,
we find







= ⌊γn⌋E [χn,γ,1(K)] (25)
+ ⌊γn⌋(⌊γn⌋ − 1)E [χn,γ,1(K)χn,γ,2(K)]


















From (23) and (24) we conclude that the one-law
limn→∞ P [In,γ(Kn) = 0] = 1 holds if we show that
lim
n→∞
⌊γn⌋E [χn,γ,1(Kn)] = 0. (27)
On the other hand, it is plain from (23) and (26) that the
zero-lawlimn→∞ P [In,γ(Kn) = 0] = 0 will be established if
lim
n→∞










The next two technical lemmas establish (27), (28) and (29)
under the appropriate conditions on the scalingK : N0 → N0.
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Lemma 7.1: Considerγ in (0, 1) and a scalingK : N0 →







0 if c > r(γ)
∞ if c < r(γ)
(30)
with r(γ) specified via (9).
Lemma 7.2: Considerγ in (0, 1) and a scalingK : N0 →









Proofs of Lemma 7.1 and Lemma 7.2 can be found in
Section VII-A and Section VII-B, respectively. To complete
the proof of Theorem 4.2, pick a scalingK : N0 → N0
such that (7) holds for somec > 0. Under the condition
c > r(γ) we get (27) from Lemma 7.1 and the one-law
limn→∞ P [In,γ(Kn) = 0] = 1 follows. Next, assume the
condition c < r(γ). We obtain (28) and (29) with the help
of Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2, respectively, and the conclusion
limn→∞ P [In,γ(Kn) = 0] = 0 is now immediate.
A. A proof of Lemma 7.1
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and γ in (0, 1), and consider a positive
integerK such thatK < n. Here as well there is no loss of
generality in assumingn − ⌊γn⌋ ≥ K and ⌊γn⌋ > 1. Under





























(n − ⌊γn⌋ − K)! ·
(n − 1 − K)!
(n − 1)! .
Now pick a scalingK : N0 → N0 such that (7) holds for
somec > 0 and replaceK by Kn in (32) with respect to this








to the factorials appearing in (32), we readily get
a(n; Kn) ∼
√
(n − ⌊γn⌋)(n − 1 − Kn)
(n − ⌊γn⌋ − Kn)(n − 1)
· αnβn
∼ αnβn (33)
under the enforced assumptions on the scaling with
αn :=

















· (n − ⌊γn⌋ − Kn)Kn .
In obtaining the asymptotic behavior of (33) we rely on the
following technical fact: For any sequencem : N0 → N0 with





∼ e−Kn . (34)
To see why (34) holds, recall the elementary decomposition




1 − t dt





= e−Kn · e−mnΨ( Knmn ) (35)
for all n = 1, 2, . . ..
Under the enforced assumptions we havemn = O(n) and






















as we note thatlimx↓0
Ψ(x)
x2
= 12 . This establishes (34) via
(35).




















n − ⌊γn⌋ − Kn
n − Kn − 1
)Kn
. (36)









n − ⌊γn⌋ − Kn
n − Kn − 1
)Kn
.




















n−1 = γ. Reporting (38) into (37) we obtain
nE [χn,γ,1(Kn)] ∼ eζn (39)
with
ζn := log n −
(⌊γn⌋ − 1
n − 1 + log
(
n − ⌊γn⌋ − Kn
n − Kn − 1
))
Kn
for all n = 1, 2, . . .. Finally, from the condition (7) on the





= 1 − c + c log(1 − γ)
γ
= 1 − c
r(γ)
.
Thus,limn→∞ ζn = −∞ (resp.∞) if r(γ) > c (resp.r(γ) <
c) and the desired result follows upon using (39).
B. A proof of Lemma 7.2
Fix positive integersn = 3, 4, . . . andK with K < n. With
γ in (0, 1), we again assume thatn−⌊γn⌋ ≥ K and⌊γn⌋ > 1.
















































n − 1 − K
n − 1
)(



























n − 1 − K
)⌊γn⌋
≤ e−K·E(n;K) (40)
where we have set
E(n; K) :=
⌊γn⌋ − 2
n − 2 −
⌊γn⌋
n − 1 − K .
Elementary calculations show that
−K · E(n; K) = ⌊γn⌋
n − 2 ·
K(K − 1)
n − 1 − K +
2K
n − 2 .
Now pick a scalingK : N0 → N0 such that (7) holds for
somec > 0. It is plain that limn→∞ KnE(n; Kn) = 0 and
the conclusion (31) follows from (40).
VIII. A PROOF OFTHEOREM 4.4
Pick 0 < γ1 < γ2 < . . . < γℓ ≤ 1 and consider a scaling




for somec > 1. It is plain that (12) will hold provided
lim
n→∞
P [Cn,γk(Kn)] = 1, k = 1, . . . , ℓ. (41)







with ck := c
γk
γ1
for all n = 1, 2, . . .. But c > 1 implies ck > 1 sinceγ1 <
. . . < γℓ. As a result,Hγk(n; Kn) will be a.a.s. connected by
virtue of Theorem 4.1 applied toHγk(n; K), and (41) indeed
holds.
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